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 Abstract:  Real-time evaluations (RTEs) are formative, utilization-focused evalu-
ations that provide immediate feedback. Within the humanitarian system, RTEs 
are an innovation for improved learning and accountability today. In fl uid and 
fast-changing environments they bridge the gap between conventional monitoring 
and evaluation, and infl uence policy and operational decision-making in a timely 
fashion. RTEs identify and propose solutions to operational and organizational 
problems in the midst of major humanitarian responses. Th e article (a) defi nes RTEs 
and situates them in the wider evaluation landscape; (b) examines RTEs’ use and 
users; (c) focuses on current methodological approaches; (d) looks into challenges, 
opportunities, and limitations that condition uptake; and (e) draws lessons and 
recommendations. 
 Keywords: learning and accountability system-wide evaluations, real-time evalua-
tion, utilization-focused 
 Résumé :  Les évaluations en temps réel (ÉTR) sont des ‘évaluations formatives axées 
sur l’utilisation qui donnent de la rétroaction immédiate. Aujourd’hui les ÉTR sont 
une innovation qui contribue à améliorer l’apprentissage et la redevabilité dans le 
système humanitaire. Dans des contextes fl uides qui changent rapidement, elles 
surmontent les lacunes entre le suivi et l’évaluation conventionnels et infl uencent 
les politiques et les prises de décisions opérationnelles de façon opportune. Les ÉTR 
identifi ent et proposent des solutions aux problèmes opérationnels et organisation-
nels au cours de réponses humanitaires majeures. Cet article (a) défi nit les ÉTR et 
les situe dans le champ plus étendu de l’évaluation; (b) éxamine l’utilisation et les 
utilisateurs des ÉTR; (c) analyse les approches méthologiques actuelles; (d) étudie les 
défi s, les possibilités, et les limites qui aff ectent la mise en œuvre; et (e) présente des 
leçons et des recommandations. 
 Mots clés :  évaluations de l’apprentissage et de l’obligation de rendre compte à l’échelle 
du système, évaluation en temps réel, évaluation axée sur l’utilisation 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 Contextualizing Real-Time Evaluations 
 Multiple defi nitions of humanitarian action exist, but for the purpose of this arti-
cle we will use the one provided by the  Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative 
(2003) . Humanitarian action is the action taken to “save lives, alleviate suff ering 
and maintain human dignity during and in the aft ermath of man-made crises 
and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the 
occurrence of such situations.” 
 When the Cold War ended, the number of agencies protecting and assisting 
people in countries aff ected by confl ict and/or disasters could oft en be counted 
on one’s hands. Funding resources for humanitarian action were limited and their 
proportion of offi  cial development assistance (ODA) was relatively small. Evalua-
tion 1 of humanitarian action was sporadic. 
 Today, the situation is fl ipped and the picture is polarized: 
 • Humanitarian action resources allocated on a yearly basis have grown up 
to US$17 billion ( Poole et al., 2012 ). For some OECD countries that are 
members of its Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the propor-
tion of humanitarian action funding represents 20% of their ODA. 
 • Th ere are countless actors involved in responding to crisis, and the 
number tends to mushroom aft er each major crisis, as observed in the 
Great Lakes genocides, the Former Yugoslavia fragmentation, the 2004 
tsunami in the Indian Ocean, the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the 2013 Philip-
pines Haiyan typhoon, or in the last three years in the countries border-
ing Syria. 
 • Every year millions of people, oft en in t he world’s poorest countries, 
 are assisted and protected to survive and recover from confl icts and 
disasters. 
 • From being exceptional, humanitarian action evaluation is a “booming 
industry.” 
 According to the ALNAP (Active Learning Network for Accountability and 
Performance in Humanitarian Action) evaluation of humanitarian action pilot 
guide, the evaluation of humanitarian action can be defi ned as “the systematic and 
objective of humanitarian action, intended to draw lessons to improve and prac-
tice and enhance accountability” ( Buchanan-Smith & Cosgrave, 2013) . However, 
humanitarian action has historically been subjected to less rigorous and extensive 
evaluation procedures than development aid, and has been plagued by poor moni-
toring and “methodological anarchy” ( Hallam, 1998 ;  OECD DAC, 1999 , p. 2). 
 In humanitarian settings objectives are fast-changing, as the situations on 
the ground are fl uid and rapidly evolve (e.g., continuous civilian population 
displacements, epidemic outbreaks), planning tends to be poorly documented, 
and baseline data are oft en absent. When confl icts prevail, security and access 
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tend to be highly deteriorated. As a result, despite multiple eff orts, performance 
and learning can stall and poor accountability to national stakeholders and aid 
recipients prevails. 
 Following years of meta-evaluation eff orts that reviewed humanitarian evalu-
ations, the limitations of longer and more costly ex-post evaluation eff orts soon 
became evident. Evaluation professionals asked themselves if “learning could be 
achieved in a mo re timely and economical fashion.” During ALNAP 2 biannual 
meetings, real-time evaluation (RTE) working groups were established, where 
evaluation professionals from the International Red Cross Movement, UN agen-
cies, international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), independent con-
sultants, and donors exchanged views and approaches putting momentum behind 
RTEs and breaking new ground in humanitarian evaluation. 
 Th e urgent nature of humanitarian response rapidly boosted RTE’s uptake 
by key humanitarian agencies that, until then, had considered that traditional 
ex-post evaluations came too late to infl uence the operations while they were 
still ongoing. As RTEs immediately provided suggestions for improvement, new 
humanitarian evaluation architecture progressively emerged, where RTEs became 
a central pillar. 
 During the fi rst Gulf War, following the massive displacement in Northern 
Iraq, an RTE prototype was trialed by the United Nations High Commissioner 
 for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1992; ho wever, it was o nly aft er the Kosovo War 
(1998–1999) that RTEs were formally introduced and planned for. Since then, 
key humanitarian actors tested RTEs and piloted their approach. In recent years, 
the number of RTEs has exponentially grown, and on average 12 RTEs have been 
fi elded each year since 2010. Nowadays RTEs are either commissioned individually 
 or jointly by donors, UN agencies, the International Red Cross Movement, and 
INGOs. RTEs are carried out by either independent or internal evaluation teams. 
 Today, a single-agency RTE may cost between US$12,000 and $70,000, while 
a joint RTE may cost between US$70,000 and $150,000. What increases costs are 
the length of evaluation; the geographical scope of the evaluation; the size of the 
team (generally from one to four consultants) and the number of internal con-
sultants as well as international and national consultants; the number of pre- and 
post-evaluation missions done by the commissioning agency; and the number of 
fi eld visits and debriefi ngs. Nevertheless, the cost of RTEs, even when they are at 
their highest, is proportionally small compared to the cost of the humanitarian 
responses they look into, and they potentially can contribute to improving the ef-
fi ciency and eff ectiveness of the overall humanitarian system response to a crisis 
( Telford, 2009) . 
 WHAT ARE RTEs? 
 When looking at the evaluand, one understands that RTEs aren’t a new model or 
theory of contemporary evaluation, but rather a new categorization of a particular 
form of formative evaluation ( Scriven, 1991 ) and process evaluation. RTEs are 
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formative evaluations of intermediary results.  Patton (2008) classifi es RTE as a 
development evaluation with the main function of improving rather than proving, 
that can be applied when a program is in a continuous state of change. RTEs are 
to be considered as one option in a utilization-focused 3 process. 
 For the purpose of this article we will look at RTEs as “a subset of humani-
tarian evaluation, which is itself a subset of development evaluation” ( Brusset, 
Cosgrave, & MacDonald, 2010 , p. 13). However, humanitarian evaluation as 
recognized tends not to be well informed by mainstream conceptual frameworks 
nor has it developed its own yet ( Feinstein & Beck, 2006 ). RTEs have been com-
monly practiced for years in various fi elds of science and technology ranging from 
computing science to health and climate change. 4 
 When looking through the evaluation spectrum, it is easy to distinguish RTEs 
from monitoring, midterm, and ex-post evaluations (see  Figure 1 ). 
 Monitoring is oft en absent in humanitarian settings and, when it is in place, 
is not always adapted to the changing realities on the ground. An RTE can help 
bridge the gap, as it provides an immediate snapshot that can help managers 
identify and address the strengths and weaknesses of the response. Furthermore, 
RTEs can also assess how well the monitoring systems are working. 
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 However, RTEs are diff erent from monitoring, in that they 
 • are prospective and look at the likely outcomes of current policies, not 
simply keeping track of whether targets are being met, 
 • are intermittent and episodic, while monitoring is continuous and rou-
tinely gathered, 
 • use and externally defi ne evaluation criteria, while monitoring generally 
applies the project management framework and predefi ned performance 
indicators to measure the extent of progress and achievement of objec-
tives of the specifi c project/program/response, 5 
 • are carried out by external and independent consultants, while monitor-
ing is generally carried out by the organization’s staff , and 
 • are used by the internal management team, donors, and other stakehold-
ers, while monitoring is used by the internal management. 
 Another distinguishing feature of RTEs is t hat they are conducted during 
implementation rather than responding aft er programs are closed. RTEs look at 
“today” to infl uence “this week’s” programming and act as immediate catalysts. 
Th erefore, they must be rapid, fl exible, and responsive. In contrast, midterm eval-
uations look at the fi rst phase of the response to infl uence programming (planning 
and design) in i ts second phase, while lessons from ex-post evaluations can be 
used in future programs when responding to crises ( Cosgrave, Ramalingam, & 
 Beck, 2009 ). 
 When Are They Carried Out and What Are They For? 
 As mentioned above, the defi ning characteristic of an RTE vis-à-vis a st andard 
evaluation is timing: RTEs are, in principle, carried out in the midst of an emer-
gency operation. When fi elded too late they become more similar to midterm 
evaluations. RTEs “encompass strategic, process and performance approaches 
 to evaluation, rather than impact evaluation, simply by virtue of its timing” 
( Sandison, 2003 , p. 7). 
 Th ey can free up operational bottlenecks and provide real-time learning. 
RTEs are also improvement-oriented reviews—dynamic tools used to adjust 
and improve planning and performance as the disaster response unfolds. When 
recurrently and systematically done, they can contribute to reinforcing account-
ability to benefi ciaries, implementing partners, and donors, and can bridge the 
gap between monitoring and ex-post evaluation. 
 An RTE is intended to be a support measure for learning in action. Th ey are 
interactive, involving a wide range of stakeholders and therefore contributing to 
peer-to-peer learning and accountability. 6 Because the results and recommenda-
tions are intended to be applied immediately, RTEs must be rapid, fl exible, and 
responsive. 
 RTEs can also reinforce the link between operations and policy formulation. 
Following the 2007 Mozambique fl oods (Cosgrave, Gonçalvez, Martyrs, Polastro, & 
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 Sikumba-Dils, 2007), an RTE examined how the UN humanitarian reforms were 
being rolled out in the fi eld. A management matrix was implemented and the 
recommendations were closely monitored by the UN Emergency Relief Coordina-
tor, looking at how Humanitarian Country Teams were applying lessons on UN 
humanitarian reform ( Beck and Buchanan-Smith, 2008 ). 
 Furthermore, in response to the failings (well documented by RTEs) of the 
international community’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake and Pakistan 
fl oods, the heads of UN agencies formally adopted the “transformative agenda” 
to address the operational challenges related to the humanitarian reform process. 7 
When publishing the interagency report of the humanitarian response to the 2010 
Pakistan fl oods, Valerie Amos, the Under-Secretary General for Emergency Re-
sponse, noted, “Th e ability to improve the humanitarian system, and ultimately to 
respond more eff ectively to future humanitarian crises, will depend on our ability 
to learn from real time lessons, e.g., by taking immediate action on evaluations 
and reviews.” 8 
 WHO ARE THEY FOR? 
 An RTE is a participatory evaluation that is intended to provide immediate feed-
back during fi eldwork. In an RTE, stakeholders are primarily executing and 
managing the response at fi eld and national levels, but also at regional and head-
quarters levels. In this type of evaluation the country team and the fi eld staff  have 
a greater stake. An RTE provides instant input to an ongoing operation and can 
foster policy, organizational, and operational change to increase the eff ectiveness 
and effi  ciency of the overall disaster response ( Jamal & Crisp, 2002) . 
 Normally, the primary audience of an RTE is managing the response in the 
fi eld, the secondary audience is at headquarters, and the tertiary audience is the 
humanitarian system as a whole. However, the stakeholders’ stakes strongly de-
pend on who initiates the evaluation and who raises the key issues to be addressed. 
If the evaluation is launched from headquarters, the level of ownership in the fi eld 
is likely to be reduced. In this case, the RTE may be perceived as intrusive and 
geared primarily to upward accountability rather than facilitating learning on the 
ground. In contrast, when the exercise is initiated in the fi eld (as was the case in 
the Mozambique interagency RTE of the response to the fl oods and cyclone in 
2007 [ Cosgrave et al., 2007] and in the humanitarian response to Pakistan’s in-
ternal displacement crisis in 2010 [ Cosgrave, Polastro, & Zafar, 2010]) , the RTE 
is usually welcomed, as all actors believe that it can contribute to improving the 
ongoing response and unlock operational bottlenecks. 
 An RTE can contribute to improved accountability to diff erent stakeholders 
by involving them throughout the evaluation process. With both interagency and 
single-agency RTEs, the agencies whose activities are being evaluated are meant to 
act on the recommendations. However, feedback tends to be given mainly to peers 
and donors. Despite being the primary “clients” of the humanitarian aid industry, 
benefi ciaries and local and national governments rarely receive feedback on the 
recommendations or how they are being implemented. 
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 Single-agency versus Interagency RTEs 
 Single-agency RTEs focus on a particular agency response, while interagency 
or “joint” RTEs and system-wide evaluations evaluate the response of the whole 
humanitarian system to a particular disaster event or complex emergency. Joint 
RTEs adopt a broader perspective and deeper understanding of cross-cutting 
elements such as the overall direction, coordination, and implementation of the 
response, including needs assessments, threats to humanitarian space, coordina-
tion, joint programming, gaps, and operational bottlenecks. Joint RTEs tend to 
look at the humanitarian system from a helicopter view perspective; they look 
at the whole forest rather than specifi cally at group of trees or the leaf, as partial 
system evaluations and program evaluations do. 
 Furthermore, as noted in the OECD DAC guidance document, joint evalua-
tions have the potential to bring benefi ts to all partners. Collaborative working off ers 
opportunities for mutual capacity development and learning between the partners, 
for building participation and ownership, for sharing the burden of the work, for 
increasing the legitimacy of fi ndings, and for reducing the overall number of evalu-
ations and the total transaction costs for partner countries ( OECD DAC, 2006 ). 
 When done jointly, an RTE represents a learning opportunity for participat-
ing agencies and national and local governments, as well as aff ected communities. 
Actors involved in the response (the aff ected population, national government, 
local authorities, the military, local NGOs, international donors, the UN, the Red 
Cross/Red Crescent, and INGOs) are consulted, fostering increased learning and 
accountability across the humanitarian system. Broad participation increases 
ownership of fi ndings and makes follow-up on recommendations more likely. 
 SOME METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES 
 Evaluating humanitarian responses provided in uncertain, turbulent, fl uid, and 
insecure environments presents challenges beyond those encountered under 
more stable conditions. Th is is mainly due to issues of access and security, and 
the frequent absence of standardized monitoring and comparable data sets on the 
response to the aff ected population ( Polastro, Khalif, et al., 2011 ). 
 Data are very sensitive, scattered, and atomized. In situations of confl ict the 
reliable information—notably statistics—that is available is oft en of insuffi  cient 
quality to make any reliable assessment. 9 To tackle this, humanitarian evaluation 
teams use various data collection methods through an inclusive and participa-
tory process, attempting to get as many stakeholders as possible involved in the 
evaluation. 
 As with other humanitarian evaluations, rapid methods are necessary for 
formative evaluation purposes. RTEs essentially use qualitative methods, includ-
ing stakeholder analysis, extensive interviews both with aid providers and aid 
recipients (snowball sampling 10 with “information-rich” individuals, group dis-
cussions, etc.), broad fi eld travel to sample sites, wide-ranging observation and 
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documentary research, thematic analysis, evidence tables to collect systematically 
the data, and workshops to validate fi ndings and prioritize recommendations. 
 As in other evaluation practice, triangulation is key to ensure data validity 
and robustness of the evidence collected. A matrix of evidence is a quick, useful, 
and systematic way to triangulate and cross-validate fi ndings. Before drawing up 
the fi ndings, teams should cross-validate the information: 
 • documents against interviews; 
 • research/documentary evidence against interviews; 
 • observation against interviews; 
 • comments against initial fi ndings presented during workshops 
 According to the Inter-Agency RTE “lessons learnt” workshop that took 
place in Geneva in November 2010, an evidence-based RTE can serve as a tool 
for change. As noted in other research, the credibility of evidence is linked to the 
credibility of its source (e.g., a respected expert or organization) and to its fi t with 
professional and practice wisdom ( Nutley, Walter, & Davies, 2007) . 
 Nevertheless, inconsistencies in methodology, an absence of theoretical un-
derpinnings, and resistance to categorization and standardization have left  some 
in the evaluation community wondering whether RTEs are suffi  ciently rigorous 
tools ( Herson & Mitchell, 2005 ). To tackle this, major humanitarian agencies such 
as UNHCR, UNICEF, and the World Food Program, as well as ALNAP and the 
Offi  ce for Coordination of Humanitarian Aff airs (OCHA) have developed specifi c 
concept papers, lessons learned, and methodological guidance. Th e overall qual-
ity of an evaluation depends on six key factors: design (purpose and approach), 
participation and ownership, planning, evidence, follow-up mechanisms, and 
evaluator credibility ( Sandison, 2006) . 
 One key success fac tor is usin g methods to create ownership and foster 
learning and participation among the agencies involved in the response. Studies 
suggest that personal contact and face-to-face interactions are the most likely to 
encourage policy and practice use of evidence, which suggests that evidence use 
may above all be a social process ( Nutley et al., 2007). 
 According to  Bamberger (2008) , one of the key determinants of whether 
an evaluation will be used is the extent to which its clients and stakeholders are 
involved in all st ages of the evaluation process. To be able to make evaluation 
evidence usable, the interests of the stakeholders must have already been correctly 
identifi ed at the beginning of the evaluation ( Carlsson, 2000) . Practice suggests 
that getting policy-makers in headquarters to own and use evidence involves get-
ting commitment and buy-in at the most appropriate levels. 
 From the outset, the methodology should be designed to ensure adequate 
and regular feedback to country-level staff . When considering methods, the team 
should choose ones that are adapted to the context and can be understood by the 
country team. 
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 Furthermore, many potentially useful evaluations have little impact be-
cause the fi ndings are not communicated to potential users in a us eful or 
comprehensible way ( Bamberger, 2008 ).When doing an RTE, the team should 
prioritize facilitated, refl ective, participatory methods to the point of develop-
ing and delivering fi nal recommendations with the main stakeholders in the 
aff ected countries. Dissemination strategies must be tailored to the target au-
diences, reaching them with timely, relevant information backed up by sound 
evidence. 
 Today evaluation managers of diff erent organizations commissioning RTEs 
are progressively using more evaluation briefs or short summaries, translations 
of the executive summary into the local language, video clips, 11 and other tailored 
communication tools to reach diff erent audiences with relevant fi ndings. 
 To be utilization-focused, the evaluation team needs to understand, before 
travelling to the fi eld, what evidence needs to be collected and for whom. An RTE 
is more interactive than other types of evaluations—the evaluator acts as a facili-
tator and must engage in a sustained dialogue with key stakeholders throughout 
the evaluation at fi eld, capital, regional, and HQ levels. Th e level of interactivity 
must be high and continuous to identify and resolve problems with organizational 
or operational performance and to act as a catalyst for improvements. While the 
evaluator observes, she/he advises on the emergency planning and operational 
process and fosters stakeholders’ involvement. 
 As a result, during the RTE process stakeholders jointly defi ne what, how, and 
who can improve the overall response, clearly outlining roles and responsibili-
ties. As in developmental evaluation, the evaluator can become part of a design 
team helping to monitor what’s happening—both processes and outcomes—in 
an evolving, rapidly changing environment of constant and immediate feedback 
( Patton, 1994, 2011). However RTEs still call for external report and accountabil-
ity while development evaluations do not. 
 OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES, AND LIMITATIONS 
 Even if they are designed to help managers be more eff ective and effi  cient while 
carrying out their diffi  cult tasks, there are some constraints that have recurrently 
challenged the full uptake of RTEs. Taken positively, or “seeing the glass half full,” 
these constraints represent opportunities. 
 1. To date the majority of RTEs have been rolled out in slow- and fast-onset 
“natural” disaster settings while very few have been fi elded in complex 
and protracted emergencies. 
 2. Generally managers are primarily drained by the heavy workload on hu-
manitarian staff  dealing with the response, which leaves them with little 
time to engage properly with the evaluation team. As a result managers 
tend to have limited ownership of evaluation processes where evaluators 
are fl own in and out. 
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 3. Despite eff orts made in recent years, baselines and other analytical docu-
mentation are missing at the early stage of a response. 
 4. Oft en fi eldwork needs to begin quickly to be most useful while it takes 
time to identify available evaluators with the skills needed. 
 5. Th e necessary time for the evaluation team to do proper analysis is lim-
ited (Brusset et al., 2010). 
 6. As observed in Haiti and nowadays in the Philippines, the number of 
RTEs fi elded in a sp ecifi c crisis is skyrocketing, triggering so-called 
“evaluation fatigue.” 
 7. National governments of the aff ected state are seldom involved in the 
evaluation process. 
 8. Funding necessary to fi eld RTEs has not always been available. 
 Following major natural disasters such the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami or the 
2010 Haiti earthquake and in disaster hotspots such as Pakistan, RTEs have not 
been a one-off  event. RTEs have been iterative, either fi elded in diff erent phases 
of the humanitarian response (emergency and recovery) to the crises or when a 
country experienced disasters of diff erent types (e.g., Pakistan, 2005 earthquake 
and 2007 and 2010 fl oods). Yet, only two interagency RTEs have been fi elded to 
evaluate the overall humanitarian response in complex emergencies, namely in 
the FATA (Federal Administered Tribal Areas and the Swat valley) and Swat val-
leys in Pakistan, and in 2005 in Darfur, Sudan. In open confl ict situations, RTEs 
are rare due to serious security and access constraints. Despite having the neces-
sary mechanisms in place, an RTE has not yet been fi elded in Syria. So far only 
UNHCR and the Disaster Emergency Committee have fi elded RTEs to look at the 
regional infl ux of refugees in host countries. 
 RTEs are one of the most challenging types of evaluations because teams are 
usually fi elded within six weeks to six months following a disaster, when agencies 
are trying to scale up or already scaling down activities. Th e interagency RTE 
carried out in Haiti in 2010 ( Grunewald, Binder, & Georges, 2010 ) was deployed 
just three months aft er the earthquake struck. However, in these circumstances 
the RTE can become burdensome to the agencies involved, and the exercise can 
suddenly become a “wrong time” evaluation. To tackle this risk, evaluation teams 
must be small and fl exible with a very light footprint in the fi eld because the entire 
team must fi t in a Land Cruiser. 
 RTEs also have to be carried out within relatively short periods, and fi ndings 
must be made available quickly. In general, teams have only two to three weeks 
to conduct the analysis and make the evaluation judgement before leaving the 
fi eld. Nevertheless, as fi ndings are then fed back for immediate use, RTEs can 
potentially identify and suggest solutions to operational problems as they occur 
and infl uence decisions when they are being made by feeding back aid recipients’ 
and providers’ views. Nowadays there is a growing tendency to describe any hu-
manitarian evaluation as “real-time.” 
 When fi elded too late, aft er the disaster emergency response is over, the rel-
evance of and need for an RTE could be questioned. During the fi rst 10 months 
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following the earthquake in Haiti, 10 separate RTEs (for donors, the Red Cross, 
UN agencies, NGOs, and at interagency level) were fi elded, which represented an 
enormous burden on staff  and key informants and triggered evaluation fatigue on 
the ground. Agencies simultaneously initiating these RTEs claim that they have 
individual learning and accountability needs, but there is no evidence to suggest 
that the added value outweighs the costs. 
 Joint RTEs, in contrast, can add value through providing a mechanism for 
increased peer-to-peer accountability, particularly if the Humanitarian Country 
Team implements recommendations. By involving aid benefi ciaries and local au-
thorities, joint RTEs can also reinforce peer-to-peer and downward accountability 
and learning. However, such conditions can be diffi  cult to achieve; so far, few have 
managed to involve the government involved at both central and provincial level. 
 Another challenge concerns who initiates and owns the evaluation. If head-
quarters initiate the evaluation, key stakeholders in the fi eld are likely to be less 
involved in the identifi cation of issues and key questions, or during implementa-
tion on the ground. For the evaluator, the challenge becomes understanding who 
poses the key questions and who will us e the evaluation fi ndings and recom-
mendations. In only a few cases so far have management matrixes been drawn up 
(defi ning which recommendations had been accepted, who was responsible for 
taking action and implementing them, and what the deadline was for doing so) 
and acted upon aft er the reports were released. 
 THE INTERAGENCY RTE OF THE 2010 PAKISTAN FLOODS 
 At the core of an RTE is the idea that stakeholders—particularly those at 
country level—do not have to wait for the evaluation report to come out to 
start implementing the recommendations. 
 During the interagency RTE of the 2010 Pakistan fl oods, three pro-
vincial workshops and one national with key stakeholders were held as the 
main feedback mechanism. Findings, conclusions, and recommendations 
were initially presented by the team leader during the workshops. Stake-
holders then jointly framed, validated, and prioritized the recommenda-
tions and defi ned the organization(s) responsible for implementing them 
(by whom) and timelines (by when). Th is process contributed to boosting 
ownership, uptake, and immediate implementation of the evaluation rec-
ommendations, fostering real-time learning and accountability among 
stakeholders engaged ( Polastro, Nagrah, Steen, & Zafar, 2011 ). 
 Th e robustness of evidence presented in t he draft  report combined 
with bottom-up country workshops infl uenced immediate use at fi eld level. 
HQ workshops, combined with regular presentations of lessons learnt on 
recent RTEs and meta-evaluations, contributed to the revision of policies 
and longer term use. 
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 Another recurrent problem in many types of evaluations is the limited time 
available for consultations with benefi ciaries. Careful planning ensures that time 
spent in the fi eld ensures maximum stakeholder consultation. For instance, in 
Mozambique the RTE was both initiated and supported by the fi eld, and four of 
the fi ve team members could travel extensively to interview over than 400 benefi -
ciaries at 16 diff erent sites and observe the response in the four provinces aff ected 
by the cyclone and fl oods ( Cosgrave et al., 2007 ). Similarly, in the 2010 Pakistan 
fl oods interagency RTE, the team incorporated lessons from previous evaluations 
and dedicated 80% of its time to fi eld consultations visiting 20 site visits. 
 Th e lack of experienced evaluators is another key challenge; suitable candi-
dates are generally booked three to six months in advance. Another limitation can 
be funding. In mid-2010 OCHA launched a call for proposals to fi eld an intera-
gency RTE in Kyrgyzstan, but no funding was secured; the Flash Appeal was also 
underfunded due to the time of year and the focus on other emergencies such as 
Haiti and Pakistan. In the case of the Pakistan displacement interagency RTE, it 
took time before donor funding was secured. 
 CONCLUSION 
 RTEs are not a new evaluation theory, but they represent an innovative way to 
evaluate humanitarian action. Today, when properly designed and led, they are a 
primary practice for improved learning, accountability, and performance across 
the sector. RTEs have grown as they have addressed specifi c stakeholders’ needs 
and may still represent a better value for money as compared to more traditional 
ex-post evaluations. In humanitarian settings the demand for RTEs is rising, as the 
context on the ground tends to be fl uid and goals are emergent and fast-changing 
rather than predetermined and fi xed.  
 To consolidate their uptake, evaluation teams should identify who are the 
end users of the evaluation and specifi cally understand who needs what informa-
tion and for what purpose and by when. Teams should systematically triangulate 
evidence drawing on a wide ra nge of data sources. When fi ndings and recom-
mendations have a solid evidence base and have been properly validated, they 
will continue to bolster ownership and adaptive planning approaches that are 
responsive to contextual change. 
 When ownership exists, recommendations can immediately be used to address 
operational and organizational problems and in the longer term infl uence policy de-
velopment. Overall, RTEs can make a signifi cant contribution to real-time learning 
and improved effi  ciency and eff ectiveness within the humanitarian system. 
 Th at said, there is a risk that RTEs may become just a wasteful and ritualistic 
exercise, especially if the humanitarian sector does not understand when it is ap-
propriate or not to launch them or how to launch them. As noted above, if RTEs 
are carried out too late or start overwhelming the fi eld they may have an adverse 
eff ect, causing an “evaluation fatigue” that hampers utilization and uptake. Th e 
tendency to use them primarily for upward donor accountability purposes rather 
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than for fi eld-level peer learning may rapidly undermine the added value of RTEs 
for personnel involved in the response. RTEs are most infl uential when carefully 
planned for and when done at the right time. 
 To maximize the potential contribution of RTEs to lesson learning, it is key 
that they adopt user-oriented approaches and become exercises that are “owned” 
and used by the fi eld, rather than headquarters-imposed exercises. When possible, 
RTEs should be iterative and not carried out by fl own-in evaluators who come and 
then disappear. Evaluators should facilitate refl ection in diff erent critical phases 
of the response. 
 Overall, to improve the humanitarian system’s planning and performance, 
RTEs should be done jointly and at the right time. A triggering mechanism, as 
outlined in the transformative agenda and in several agencies’ evaluation policies, 
to ensure that RTEs happen and that adequate human and fi nancial resources are 
allocated must be more systematically used even in those situations such as Syria 
where access and security may be limited. 
 Incentives for improving knowledge management and fostering real-time 
learning and accountability should be identifi ed at the fi eld level. Th e fi rst step 
would be to regularly roll out bottom-up workshops with key stakeholders to 
validate and prioritize recommendations presented in the draft  report and assign 
responsibility for implementation. A second step would be to systematically defi ne 
who is responsible for implementing recommendations produced and draw ac-
tion plans once these have been formulated. 12 
 Once the action plans are agreed upon, they should be regularly monitored. 
In addition, to ensure adequate involvement of fi eld-level stakeholders in the RTE 
(including aid recipients and local authorities, when possible), initiating organiza-
tions need to provide regular feedback to them on the implementation of recom-
mendations. Last but not least, lessons from RTEs should be better disseminated 
to the broader evaluation community.  
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 NOTES 
  1  According to its Latin etymology, “to evaluate” means “to ascertain the value or worth of. ” 
 2    ALNAP membership works together to identify common approaches to improved 
performance; explore new ways to improve learning and accountability through 
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 evaluations and other mechanisms; and share ideas, lessons, and innovations. Th e over-
all aim is to make an active contribution to solving longstanding challenges facing the 
sector. For more information see the minutes of the ALNAP meeting in Nairobi and the 
record of the RTE workshop under the auspices of UNICEF and OCHA at the ALNAP 
meeting in Rome,  www.alnap.org/meetings/pdfs/20meetingreport.pdf   
 3 According to  Patton (1994 , p. 317), “Utilization-focused evaluation is a p rocess for 
making decisions about and focusing an evaluation on intended use by intended 
users. Utilization-focused evaluation shift s attention from methods or the object of 
evaluation (e.g., a program) to the intended users of evaluative processes and infor-
mation, and their intended uses. Th e evaluator, rather than acting as an independent 
judge, becomes a facilitator of evaluative decision-making by intended users. Th us, the 
utilization-focused evaluator facilitates judgements about merit and worth by intended 
users rather than highlighting his or her own judgements.” 
  4 E.g., Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative, 
 http://www.oecd.org/derec/norway/48086385.pdf   
  5  Performance indicators are measures of inputs, processes, outputs, outcomes, and 
impact for development projects, programs, or strategies. When supported with sound 
data collection (perhaps involving formal surveys), analysis, and reporting, indicators 
enable managers to track progress, demonstrate results, and take corrective action to 
improve service delivery ( World Bank, 2004 ). 
  6  Using Michael Scrivens’ distinction (1991) w hen he quoted Robert Stake: “When 
the cook (or chef) tastes the soup, that’s formative; when the guests taste the soup, 
that’s summative.” Building on this distinction, we can liken RTE to a team of sous 
chefs that oft en involve the restaurant guests in the kitchen (e.g., senior management, 
decision-makers, communication experts, external audiences, members of the aff ected 
populations) to taste the soup before serving in the dining area. “If not to their palate, 
ingredients can be changed or possibly the entire eff ort discarded.” 
  7  For more information on the transformative agenda, see  http://www.humanitarian 
 info.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-template-default&bd=87   
   8  https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/news/publication-ia-rte-pakistan-fl oods-
report  
   9  See more at  http://daraint.org/2013/04/24/4481/alnap-a-call-for-evidence-based- 
 decision-making-in-humanitarian-response/#sthash.rczXKmLo.dpuf  
 10  A snowball sample is a sample that is expanded by asking the initial interviewees to 
recommend others they believe would be useful sources of information. Th e process 
begins by asking them, “Who knows a lot about ...? Whom should I talk to ....?” In 
snowball sampling, you begin by identifying someone who meets the criteria for in-
clusion in your study. You then ask them to recommend others who they may know 
who also meet the criteria. Although this method would hardly lead to representative 
samples, there are times when it may be the best method available. Snowball sampling 
is especially useful when you are trying to reach populations that are inaccessible or 
hard to fi nd. See  http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/sampnon.php   
 11  See the link to the short video used to disseminate both the fi ndings and the own-
ership of the process during the Inter Agency Real Time Evaluation of the Hu-
manitarian Response to 2010 fl oods in Pakistan.   http://www.youtube.com/watch? 
 v=qW-XR14k4NQ  
 12  About two thirds of the OECD DAC bilateral donors have mechanisms in place to 
ensure that management responds to and follows up on evaluation fi ndings ( OECD 
DAC, 2013 ).  
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